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Will California's "One Strike" Law 
Stop Sexual Predators, or Is a Civil 
Commitment System Needed? 
This Comment urges California* and other jurisdictions to 
enact sexual predator laws to civilly commit dangerous, mentally ill 
sex offenders who are nearing release from prison and are a 
credible threat to re-offend. Such statutes, though, are appropriate 
and constitutional only when they are narrowly tailored to achieve 
this goal. A Model Sexual Predators Act included in the Appendix 
surmounts substantive and procedural due process concerns, 
increases the safety of the public, and safeguards the accused 
individuals interest in liberty. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the ten-year prison sentence of convicted child molester Earl 
Shriner was nearing completion in the State of Washington. As his 
release date neared, prison officials sought to keep Shriner behind bars 
because they discovered letters and drawings that expressed his desire to 
molest and kill children by using a mobile torture chamber. 1 However, 
Shriner did not meet Washington State's existing mental health civil 
* Editor's Note: After this Comment was written, the California Legislature 
passed a sexual predator commitment law. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 6600-08 
(West Supp. 1996). However, according to the author of this Comment, California's 
sexual predator law is very similar to Washington's law, which was recently declared 
unconstitutional by a federal district court. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding that the law violated the Due Process, Ex Post Facto, and 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution). Because California bases its approach on 
what is believed to be an unconstitutional civil commitment scheme, the author urges the 
California Legislature to adopt a substantively fairer approach such as that suggested by 
the Model Sexual Predators Act in the Appendix of this Comment. 
1. Kate Shatzkin, Lack of Remorse Key in Sentence for Shriner, Exceptional 131-
Year Term Given/or Mutilationo/Tacoma Boy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at Cl. 
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commitment statute2 because he had not committed a "recent overt 
act"3 and was not mentally ill according to psychiatrists. Shriner was 
released from prison and two years later4 acted on his intentions. He 
lured a young Tacoma boy into the nearby woods, raped him repeatedly, 
stabbed him in the back, cut his penis off with a knife, and left the boy 
for dead after choking him. Despite this brutal attack, the boy survived 
and identified Shriner as his assailant.5 Following this incident, a wave 
of public outcry compelled the Washington State Legislature to take 
action.6 The result was Washington's Sexually Violent Predators (SVP) 
law, which permits civil commitment7 of violent sex offenders after the 
offender's prison term has been served. 8 
When twelve-year-old Polly Klaas disappeared from her home in 
Northern California on October 1, 1993, the limitations of the criminal 
justice system were again exposed. Two months after she vanished, 
parolee Richard Allen Davis9 was arrested and led authorities to Klaas's 
body. 10 Davis had allegedly kidnapped Klaas from a slumber party at 
2. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
3. See In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (Wash. 1982). Shriner was locked up in 
prison for 10 years, thereby making a recent overt act a virtual impossibility. For further 
discussion on overt act requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 146-52. 
4. During these two years, Shriner had additional problems with the law. Three 
months after his 1987 release, Shriner was given a 90-day sentence for stabbing a 16-
year-old boy in the arm. Then, a year later, he grabbed a boy behind a store, unbuttoned 
the boy's pants, tied him to a fence post, and beat the boy with his fists. That crime 
earned him a 67-day jail sentence. Sally MacDonald & Jim Simon, Suspect Fell 
Through the Cracks of the System, SEA TILE TIMES, May 24, 1989, at A7. 
5. Id 
6. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need 
to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment 
Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 214 (1991) (citing Barry Siegal, Locking Up 
"Sexual Predators," L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al, A30). 
7. Civil commitment rather than criminal incarceration is used for those 
individuals, such as insanity acquittees or the mentally ill, who are in need of treatment 
and are a danger to society. Unlike criminal prosecution and incarceration, which are 
based on deterrence and retribution, civil commitment, although usually indefinite in 
duration, must end when the individual is either no longer dangerous to society or is no 
longer mentally ill. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992). The 
SVP law allows the state to use the civil system rather than the criminal justice system 
to indefinitely remove a sexual predator from society. 
8. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
9. Davis had been previously convicted of burglary, attempted sexual assault on 
a woman at knife-point, assaulting a woman with a fireplace poker, escaping from a 
mental hospital, and forcing his way into a woman's apartment and compelling her at 
gun-point to give him money. He was released from prison in June of 1993 after serving 
his sentence for the most recent of these offenses. On October 1, 1993, less then four 
months after Davis's release, Polly Klaas was kidnapped and killed. Debra J. Saunders, 
What Price Justice/or Polly?, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30, 1994, at A27. 
10. Ron Sonenshine, Polly Klaas Slaying Suspect to Stand Trial, Richard Allen 
Davis Could Be Sentenced to Death, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 1994, at Al. 
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her home, sexually assaulted her, strangled her to death, and then buried 
her in a shallow grave. 11 The public was outraged to learn that the 
alleged killer was a parolee who had prior sex-related convictions. 
California lawmakers scrambled to push through legislation, as 
constituents statewide demanded tougher laws to protect society from 
repeat offenders, especially violent sex offenders. 12 Within a year, 
California had passed the "one strike" law, which mandates a minimum 
sentence of either fifteen or twenty-five years to life for violent sex 
offenders. 13 
The public's reaction to these two horrifying stories spurred the 
respective state legislatures to attempt different solutions to the problem 
of repeat violent sex offenders who slip through the cracks of the 
criminal justice system. Washington's SVP statute and California's "one 
strike" law are examined in Section II of this Comment. Washington's 
law seeks to prevent new offenses from occurring by committing the 
"predator" before another offense can be perpetrated. On the other hand, 
California's law severely stiffens prison sentences for those convicted of 
newly committed sex offenses. Although California's "one strike" law 
promises to keep future offenders off the streets for substantially longer 
periods of time, the "one strike" law cannot effectively protect its 
citizenry from violent sex offenders who are nearing release from prison, 
yet remain credible threats to re-offend. Therefore, this Comment argues 
that California should adopt a modified version of Washington's SVP 
law to fill in the dangerous void left by the "one strike" law. 
11. Dan Reed & Ron Sonenshine, 8 Charges In Polly Case-SuspectF aces Death 
Penalty, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8, 1993, at Al. Four of the counts against Davis alleged that 
he tied and gagged two of Klaas' friends who witnessed the abduction and threatened 
them with a knife. Id. One hour after the kidnapping had occurred, two sheriff's 
deputies apparently talked with Davis about the fact that his car was in a ditch next to 
a main road. After helping Davis get his car out of the ditch, the deputies left. Later 
in the investigation, law enforcement agents discovered strips of cloth, Klaas' s tights, and 
a sweatshirt only 60 feet from where the officers had questioned Davis. Discovery of 
an unrolled condom with the clothing near the ditch, id., as well as the fact that Klaas' s 
body was found with her skirt pushed above her waist and her shirt open, led prosecutors 
to charge Davis with sexually assaulting the girl. Sonenshine, supra note 10. 
12. See Ken Chavez, Wilson Claims Victory on Dozen Crime Bills, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Sept. 2, 1994, at A3. 
13. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 14 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667.61, 
667.71, 1203.066 (West Supp. 1995)). 
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The constitutional problems facing Washington's SVP scheme14 are 
discussed in Section III of this Comment. That section focuses on In re 
Young, 15 the first Washington Supreme Court decision to consider 
constitutional challenges to the SVP law. Section III will analyze the 
Young court's decision regarding the issue of whether the SVP law is 
civil or punitive in nature, as well as the substantive and procedural due 
process challenges raised by the petitioners. 16 
The Appendix to this Comment consists of a model statute that was 
drafted by the author. The model statute incorporates portions of 
established "sexual predator" statutes from various jurisdictions as well 
as innovations created by the author. 17 Accompanying each section of 
the model statute is commentary describing the origins of that particular 
section and the reasons for the modifications or innovations contained 
therein. This model statute, the Model Sexual Predators Act (MSPA), 
was carefully drawn to be more narrow in scope than Washington's 
commitment statute. The MSPA overcomes the potential constitutional 
shortcomings of the SVP law by requiring a psychiatrically recognized 
mental illness rather than the SVP's legislatively created and defined 
"mental abnormality." The MSPA also strikes a better balance between 
society's legitimate need for protection and the moral and constitutional 
rights to which an accused individual is entitled. Although the Due 
Process Clause, as interpreted by the current United States Supreme 
Court, is unlikely to require an increased number or quality of individual 
protections in future sexual predator statutes, 18 fairness and morality 
mandate this development. 19 The MSPA meets these goals and also 
includes a unique section that mandates the classification of accused 
predators by degree of dangerousness and severity of mental illness, 20 
thereby enabling jurists to choose meaningful alternatives to indefinite 
commitment. 21 
14. This Comment will not address the presumed constitutionality of California's 
sentence-enhancing "one strike" law because the focus of this Comment is on civil 
commitment schemes for sexual predators, not sentence-enhancing laws. 
15. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993). 
16. For the discussion of these issues, see infra Section III. 
17. See Appendix, infra. 
18. For a discussion of the procedural due process arguments, see infra text 
accompanying notes 122-57. 
19. Compare Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly 
Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PuGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 753-54 (1992), 
with John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or 
Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 755, 778 (1992). 
20. See infra Appendix, MSPA § 2(3)-(4). 
21. See infra Appendix, MSPA § 5.2. 
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IL THE STATUTES 
A. California's "One Strike" Law 
California's Governor, Pete Wilson, signed into law a number of anti-
crime bills, including the "one strike" law, in September of 1994.22 
The "one strike" law increased the length of the prison terms to which 
sex offenders will be sentenced by adding a new section to the 
California Penal Code and amending two other sections.23 Specifically, 
the "one strike" law mandates that a person convicted of a sex offense 
listed in Penal Code section 667.61(c)24 will be sentenced under certain 
circumstances to life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
twenty-five years.25 A person convicted of a sex offense under other 
22. See Chavez, supra note 12. In addition to the enactment of Senate Bill 26, 
commonly referred to as the "one strike" law, other like-minded legislation was signed 
into law: 1993-94 Cal. Legis. Serv. 447 (West) (any person convicted of felony 
violation of specified sex offenses shall be punished by additional consecutive term of 
25 years to life); 1993-94 Cal. Legis. Serv. 446 (West) (punishes habitual sex offender 
with 25-year-to-life sentences and prohibits parole for at least 25 years); 1993-94 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. 878 (West) (provides that specified sex offenses against a child under 14 
years of age shall be punished by a 15-year-to-life prison term); 1993-94 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. 18 (West) (increases the sentences of felony sex offenders who kidnap their 
victims). 
23. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 14 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.61, 
667.71, 1203.066 (West Supp. 1995)). 
24. Section 667.61(c) applies to any of the following offenses: (I) Rape by force 
or fear (CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2)); (2) Rape of a person unable to give consent 
(CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a)(3)); (3) Aiding or abetting rape (CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 264.1 ); ( 4) Lewd or lascivious acts, by means of force or fear, with a child under 14 
years ofage (CAL. PENAL CODE§ 288(b ); (5) Penetration by foreign object (CAL. PENAL 
CODE§ 289); (6) Sodomy (CAL. PENAL CODE§ 286) or oral copulation (CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 288a) by force or fear; and (7) Lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14 
years ofage (CAL. PENAL CODE § 288( a)), unless defendant qualifies for probation under 
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1203.066(c) (see infra note 35). CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.61(c) 
(West Supp. 1995). 
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61(a) (West Supp. 1995). Section 667.61(a) states 
that a person who is convicted of an offense specified in subd. ( c) under one or more of 
the circumstances specified in subd. (d) or under two or more of the circumstances 
specified in subd. ( e) shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall not be eligible for 
parole for 25 years. Id Section 667 .61 ( d) includes any of the following enumerated 
circumstances: (I) Prior conviction of offenses specified in subd. (c), including those 
in other jurisdictions with elements equivalent to subd. ( c) offenses; (2) Kidnapping that 
substantially increased the risk of harm above the risk level inherent in the underlying 
offense specified in subd. (c); (3) Aggravated mayhem (CAL. PENAL CODE§ 205) or 
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circumstances will be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole for fifteen years.26 If there are multiple victims, the law 
mandates that the offender receive a separate prison term for each 
victim.27 The law further denies the convicted offender the possibility 
of probation or the suspension of his or her sentence if the offense is one 
of the first six offenses enumerated in Penal Code section 667.61(c).28 
Habitual sex offenders29 that are sentenced under the "one strike" law 
also receive a sentence of twenty-five years to life.3° For first-time sex 
offenders and habitual sex offenders alike, the opportunity for parole is 
expressly prohibited until the offender has served at least eighty-five 
percent of the minimum prison term.31 
torture (CAL. PENAL CODE § 206); ( 4) Commission of the offense during a burglary 
(CAL. PENAL CODE § 460(a)) with the intent to commit an offense specified in 
§ 667.67(c). CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6l(d) (West Supp. 1995). Section 667.6l(e) 
includes any of the following enumerated circumstances: (1) Except as provided in 
§ 667.6l(d)(2), kidnapping (CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 207,208,209, or 209.5); (2) Except 
as provided in § 667.61 ( d)( 4), commission of the offense during a burglary (CAL. PENAL 
CODE§ 460(a)) or burglary of a building, including a commercial establishmentthat was 
closed to the public (CAL. PENAL CODE § 459); (3) Personal infliction of great bodily 
injury during the commission of an offense (CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022. 7-.8); ( 4) Use 
of a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of an offense (CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 12022, 12022.3, or 12022.5); (5) In the present case or cases, conviction of a subd. 
( c) offense against more than one victim; ( 6) Tying or binding the victim or another in 
the commission of the offense; (7) Administering a controlled substance to the victim 
by force, violence, or fear in the commission of the offense (CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 12022.75). CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6l(e) (West Supp. 1995). 
26. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.6l(b) (West Supp. 1995). The section states that a 
person who is convicted of an offense specified in subd. (c) under one of the 
circumstances specified in subd. (e) shall be sentenced to life in prison and shall not be 
eligible for parole for 15 years. Id 
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6l(g) (West Supp. 1995). 
28. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.6l(h) (West Supp. 1995). See supra note 24 for the 
enumerated offenses. 
29. Defined by statute as "a person who has been previously convicted of one or 
more of the offenses listed in subdivision (d) [of§ 667.71] and who is convicted in the 
present proceeding of one of those offenses." CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.71(a) (West 
Supp. 1995). Section 667.71(d) expands the number of offenses that trigger the habitual 
sex offender section. This section also includes other jurisdictions' convictions that meet 
the elements of one of the specified offenses. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. 71 ( d) (West 
Supp. 1995). 
30. However intriguing the plight of the overcrowded prison system may be, this 
Comment will not focus on the inevitable budgetary and other problems associated with 
implementing the "one strike" law or other sentence enhancement laws. For a discussion 
of these issues, see Saunders, supra note 9; Editorial, On Mandatory Sentences. . . 'One 
Strike' Will Backfire L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 12, 1994, at 6. 
31 Credit reduction of prison terms does apply to reduce the minimum terms under 
the "one strike" law. However, § 667.610) prohibits the article's application beyond 
15% of the minimum term and dictates that parole is not possible until 85% of minimum 
term has been served. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61(j) (West. Supp. 1995). Section 
667.71(b) has the identical prohibitions regarding credit reduction for habitual sex 
offenders' minimum 25-year term. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.71(b) (West. Supp. 1995). 
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One of the earlier drafts of the "one strike" legislation called for life 
sentences without the possibility of parole for all sex crimes, including 
so-called "acquaintance rape" cases and cases involving family 
members.32 However, women's groups and some prosecutors opposed 
this tough stance. Victims, especially children, they argued, would be 
hesitant to testify against a loved one if a conviction would automatically 
lead to a life sentence without the possibility of parole.33 Since the 
early stages, the "one strike" legislation has been amended numerous 
times to factor into account similar considerations.34 Accordingly, to 
avoid the inequitably harsh result of either no conviction or life 
imprisonment, the "one strike" law presently permits the courts to punish 
some sex offenders, in severely limited situations, with sentences as 
lenient as probation.35 
32. Ken Chavez, 'One Strike' Bill Amended to Satisfy Critics, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
May 7, 1994, at A3. 
33. Id. 
34. Senate Bill 26, introduced by Senator Bergeson on Feb. 2, 1994, was amended 
four times before the final version was enacted. The original bill only called for 
enhancing existing sex offender sentences to 6, 12, or 16 years. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 
14 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.61, 667.71, 1203.066). 
35. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1203.066(WestSupp.1995). Subsection(c) allows lesser 
penalties if the court finds that: 
(1) The defendant is the victim's natural parent, adoptive parent, stepparent, 
relative, or is a member of the victim's household who has lived in the 
household. 
(2) A grant of probation to the defendant is in the best interest of the child. 
(3) Rehabilitation of the defendant is feasible ... and the defendant is 
placed in a recognized treatment program designed to deal with child 
molestation immediately after the grant of probation or the suspension of 
execution or imposition of sentence. 
( 4) The defendant is removed from the household of the victim until the 
court determines that the best interests of the victim would be served by 
returning the defendant to the household of the victim. 
(5) There is no threat of physical harm to the child victim if probation is 
granted. The court upon making its findings pursuant to this subdivision is not 
precluded from sentencing the defendant to jail or prison, but retains the 
discretion not to do so. 
Id Subsection ( c) also requires that the court appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to 
make a report regarding paragraphs (2), (3), and (4). Id 
For more detailed comments on psychiatry and sex offenders, see Robert M. Wettstein, 
M.D., A PsychiatricPerspectiveon Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597 (1992), and see also Gleb, supra note 6. 
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The purpose of the "one strike" law is to effectively remove both first-
time and habitual sex offenders from the streets.36 Under the statute, 
courts are compelled to dole out prison sentences of unprecedented 
length for sex offense convictions. Once imprisoned under the "one 
strike" scheme, convicted offenders may be monitored by parole boards 
for signs of future dangerousness to ensure that high-risk parole 
candidates are not released.37 Although the "one strike" law promises 
to be successful at enhancing punishment and enabling consideration of 
dangerousness before parole, it is not currently capable ofresponding "to 
the long-existing but previously unsolved problem of what to do about 
sex offenders whose prison terms are [presently] expiring, yet who are 
regarded as still extremely dangerous."38 The "one strike" law is silent 
with respect to those habitual sex offenders awaiting release from prison 
who have expressed a credible desire to harm others again. Although 
the days of lenient sentencing may have passed,39 many dangerous 
offenders who were given light sentences in the past are now being 
released into a society that is screaming for protection after the Polly 
Klaas and Earl Shriner tragedies.40 The "one strike" law is likely to be 
an effective means to lock up dangerous sex criminals after they have 
been caught again, but the law is powerless to stop already known sex 
offenders from stepping out of their prison cells and preying on new 
victims. 
B. Washington 's Sexually Violent Predators Act 
In 1990, the Washington Legislature made a bold move away from the 
modem trend of abolishing statutes that call for the civil commitment of 
sex offenders41 by enacting the Sexually Violent Predators Act.42 The 
36. Chavez, supra note 32. 
37. Subsections (a) and (b) of§ 667.61 mandate a life term upon conviction with 
parole eligibility beginning in either 25 or 15 years, respectively. CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 667.61 ( a)-(b )(West Supp. 1995). Under this scheme, the court will sentence offenders 
to life terms and the parole boards will then have the authority to parole the offenders 
only when and if they are safe for release. If implemented in this fashion, the "one 
strike" law could effectively impact the number of violent repeat offenders in society by 
keeping them in jail ad infinitum. 
38. Brooks, supra note 19, at 710. 
39. Nearly Half of Sex Offenders Avoid Prison, Paper Says, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
May 31, 1994, at BS. "Nearly half of the sex offenders in California don't go to prison, 
and those who do serve time are released in an average [of] 3-1/2 years because of jail 
overcrowding .... " Id The article cites its source as a 1992 California Department 
of Justice analysis of 1992 sex crime data. 
40. See supra text accompanying notes 1-13. 
41. See, e.g., Gleb, supra note 6, at 215. Concern about civil rights and claims of 
ineffective treatment for sex offenders have been the principal motivation for repealing 
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SVP law permits indefinite confinement of sexually violent predators 
who do not necessarily have a psychiatrically recognized mental disease 
or defect. To qualify as a sexual predator under the statute, the sex 
offender must have been previously convicted of a crime of sexual 
violence and suffer from a "mental abnormality" or "personality 
disorder"43 that makes him or her likely to engage in predatory acts of 
sexual violence.44 Washington's legislature considered the state's 
existing commitment statute for the mentally ill45 inappropriate for 
sex offender civil commitment schemes. By 1990, only 13 states still had these schemes, 
compared to 26 states in 1960. Id California repealed its sex offender commitment 
scheme in 1981. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§§ 6300-31 (repealed 1981). During 
this period, many jurisdictions repealed their schemes because of the 
[g]rowing awareness that there is no specific group of individuals who can be 
labeled sexual psychopaths by acceptable medical standards and that there are 
no proven treatments for such offenders .... [P]rofessional groups [such] as 
the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, the President's Commission on 
Mental Health, and most recently, the American Bar Association Committee 
on Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards ... urge that these [sexual 
psychopath] laws be repealed. 
Beth K. Fujimoto, Comment, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional 
Parameters/or Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REv. 879, 904 (1992) ( citing SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND 
THE LAW 740, 743 (3d ed. 1985)). 
Led by Washington's initiative, state legislatures in Wisconsin, Kansas, Iowa, and 
Minnesota have recently enacted sexual predator statutes similar to the SVP law. Also, 
10 other states are considering such legislation. See Erin Gunn, Comment, Washington's 
Sexually Violent Predator Law: The 'Predatory' Requirement, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 
277, 279-80 n.13 (1994). 
42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
43. The Washington Legislature has defined the term "personality disorder" as a 
disorder recognized by psychiatric medicine. The term "mental abnormality" has been 
legislatively defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual 
acts in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.020(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). The term "mental 
abnormality" is not a psychiatric term. For a discussion of the problems caused by the 
Washington Legislature's definition of that term, see infra notes 103-21 and the 
accompanying text. 
44. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Note: the 
sex offender need not be imprisoned for a petition to be filed for civil commitment. For 
example, Vance Cunningham was a free man when he was convicted of being a sexual 
predator and indefinitely committed. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 995 (Wash. 1993). 
45. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
1257 
civilly committing sexual predators because that statute requires a more 
specific and higher level of mental disease or defect.46 
Washington's sexual predator commitment scheme is designed to 
operate in the following manner. As the prison release date of each sex 
offender approaches, the Department of Corrections staff performs a 
screening procedure to determine which offenders should still be 
considered dangerous to the public. The End of Sentence Review 
Referral Subcommittee (ESRRS)47 and the Indeterminate Sentence 
Review Board (ISRB)48 then further narrow this group of potential 
sexual predators by determining which offenders present a high risk of 
committing future sex offenses. This is the group that is brought to the 
attention of prosecuting attorneys and the Attorney General. 49 In order 
to make this determination, the ESRRS and the ISRB examine the 
offender's record of prior arrests and convictions for sexually violent 
crimes, overall criminal history, records of prior mental evaluations 
and/or treatments,50 current mental health evaluations, pre-sentence and 
end-of-sentence review reports, the offender's version of his offenses, 
records of any interviews, and institutional records describing the 
offender's behavior while in custody.51 After receiving an ESRRS 
referral, the prosecuting attorney then reviews the case and has the 
authority to file a personal restraint petition with the court to seek civil 
commitment of the offender. 52 In cases where the alleged predator has 
46. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). The 
statute for committing the mentally ill is not well suited to committing sexual predators 
because its aim is directed towards individuals with "serious mental disorders" that only 
need short-term treatment before being returned to society. Id. Furthermore, the mental 
illness commitment statute requires an overt act. Legislators wanted to avoid the overt 
act requirement because imprisoned sexual predators have no opportunity to perform an 
overt act and, therefore, could not be committed under the existing statute. See id. 
4 7. The ESRRS is composed of members from the Departments of Corrections and 
Social and Health Services. Brooks, supra note 19, at 714 (citing DIVISION OF PRISONS, 
WASHINGTON DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, DIVISION DIRECTIVE REFERRING SELECT 
OFFENDERS TO THE END OF SENTENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE (ESRC) (May 28, 1991)). 
48. Formerly the Parole Board. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Including psychological or psychiatric testing, group notes, autobiographical 
notes, progress notes, psycho-social reports, and other material gathered while the 
offender was in custody. Id. ( citing letter from Jeanne Tweten, Assistant Attorney 
General, State of Washington, Criminal Division, to Professor Alex Brooks, Rutgers Law 
School (Apr. 7, 1992) (containing final draft of Washington Attorney General's 
"Sexually Violent Predator Filing Standards") (on file with the University of Puget 
Sound Law Review)). 
51. Id. at 715. 
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). The law 
defines a sexually violent predator as any person who suffers from a personality disorder 
that makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence and is 
convicted or charged with a violent sex crime against a stranger (such as first degree 
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already been released from prison, the onus lies solely with the 
prosecuting authority to initiate an investigation and file a petition with 
the court seeking commitment.53 Although the SVP law itself does not 
require any showing of recidivism, the Washington State Attorney 
General requires that the offender exhibit a pattern of predatory acts 
before a prosecutor may file a petition under the statute. If the court 
decides that probable cause exists for the charge, the alleged predator is 
moved to a special maximum security facility, which is operated by the 
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), for further evaluation 
and preparation for trial. 54 
Unlike an ordinary civil trial, the prosecution carries the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the person before the court is a sexually violent preda-
tor.55 The Washington legislation assures that the alleged predator is 
afforded the right to a jury trial within forty-five days after the filing of 
the petition, the right to have legal counsel appointed, and the assistance 
of mental health professionals for evaluation and expert testimony. 56 
If convicted, the predator is indefinitely committed to the DSHS 
facility. 57 Washington law then requires the DSHS staff to develop an 
rape, second degree rape by forcible compulsion, or indecent liberties against a child 
under age 14). WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
53. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.030 (West 1992& Supp. 1995). Ifthecourt 
finds probable cause for the petition, an arrest warrant is issued and the alleged predator 
is apprehended and taken to a Department of Social and Health Services facility. See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
54. Brooks, supra note 19, at 715. Among other things, the Attorney General's 
filing standards also require a mental health professional to find a "mental abnormality 
or personality disorder" that makes the offender more likely to commit sexually violent 
acts. Id. For a discussion of the problems created by the Washington Legislature's 
definition of "mental abnormality," see infra notes 103-21 and accompanying text. 
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
57. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Once a 
person is committed as a sexual predator, the predator is given an annual examination 
to determine mental condition. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.070 (West 1992 & 
Supp. 1995). The predator also has an annual right to petition for a hearing. The court 
first determines whether to deny the hearing or whether there is probable cause to believe 
that the predator's condition has changed enough to warrant another trial. WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 71.09.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). At trial, the prosecution again 
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the "person's mental 
abnormality or personality disorder remains such that the person is not safe to be at large 
and if released will engage in acts of sexual violence." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.09.090(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). If the prosecution bears its burden, the 
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individualized treatment plan for the committed predator 58 and to 
provide the predator with a number of rights and privileges not usually 
associated with maximum-security prison facilities. 59 
The Washington Legislature's intent is unequivocal: keep sexual 
predators away from society, regardless of whether they have already 
served their so-called "debt to society." The means to achieve this goal 
is a system of indefinite civil commitment and treatment, which the SVP 
statute itself admits is doubtful to produce any cure or effective 
treatment for these sex offenders.60 The standards and procedures 
established by the varied legislation that constitutes the SVP law are 
essential to keep truly dangerous individuals out of mainstream society. 
Although "[o]pponents' fears of a civil commitment drift-net cast by 
overzealous prosecutors over the prison population to catch hundreds of 
sex offenders" have not materialized,61 Washington's current system 
still appears vulnerable to abuse if its virtually limitless definition of 
"mental abnormality" remains untempered. 62 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS 
From the outset, commentators have argued vehemently over the 
constitutionality and validity of Washington's Sexually Violent Predators 
law.63 This section focuses on the constitutional problems facing 
predator's commitment will once again continue indefinitely. 
58. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 275-155-040 (1994). This code section requires the 
DSHS to develop an individualized treatment plan ("ITP") that includes: (a) a 
description of the predator's specific treatment needs; (b) an outline ofintermediate and 
long-term treatment goals; ( c) treatment strategies; ( d) a description of the DSHS staff's 
responsibilities; and (e) criteria for recommending whether the predator should be 
released. Furthermore, this section provides for a review of the predator's ITP at least 
every six months. Id. 
59. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 275-155-050 (1994). Some of these rights and 
privileges include having an attorney and retaining a "professionally qualified person" 
for psychological evaluation, wearing their own clothes and keeping some personal 
possessions, having personal storage space, having reasonable telephone and other 
correspondence privileges, and having the right to petition the court for release. Id. 
60. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) 
("[S]exually violent predators generally have antisocial personality features which are 
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities .... "). 
61. Norm Maleng, The Community Protection Act and the Sexually Violent 
Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 821, 825 (1992). 
62. For a discussion on the mental illness requirement and the problems related to 
it, see infra text accompanying notes 103-21. 
63. Compare La Fond, supra note 19 (SVP statute unconstitutional and capricious) 
andBrian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington 'sNew Violent Sexual Predator Commitment 
System: An Unconstitutional Law and An Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND 
L. REV. 105 (1990) (unconstitutional) with Brooks, supra note 19 (law constitutional and 
morally acceptable) and Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness 
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Washington's SVP law and scrutinizes the Washington State Supreme 
Court's decision in In re Young, 64 where the court decreed that there 
are "no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually violent 
predator scheme."65 In order to determine the validity of the 
appellants' ex post facto and double jeopardy claims, Section III.A. of 
this Comment concentrates on the question of whether the SVP statute 
is civil or punitive in nature. The appellants' substantive due process 
claims, which are the strongest challenges set forth by the appellants, are 
considered in Section III.B. Section III.C. explores the procedural due 
process and equal protection challenges raised by the appellants. 
The appeals of Andre Brigham Young and Vance Russell Cunningham 
from their respective sexual predator convictions were consolidated by 
the Young court. Young's personal restraint petition was filed against 
him one day before he was set for release from prison, after serving time 
for his latest rape conviction. 66 In an ex parte proceeding, 67 the 
judge, after reviewing two psychological evaluations and Young's prior 
criminal history, 68 found probable cause for the petition and ordered 
Young to the DSHS facility until trial. After hearing testimony from 
Young's previous rape victims and starkly contrasting testimony from 
expert psychologists for both the prosecution and the defense, the jury 
and Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277 (1992) 
(constitutionally permissible and morally responsible to restrain offender's liberty). 
64. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993). This case is expected to be appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. As of the date of printing, a federal district court has reversed the state 
supreme court ruling and held that the SVP law is unconstitutional. See Young v. 
Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995). An appeal to the Ninth Circuit is 
pending. 
65. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000. 
66. Id at 994. 
67. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
68. Young, 857 P.2d at 994. Young's first known rapes occurred in 1962 when 
he was convicted of four counts of first degree rape: Young broke into the respective 
homes of four women and forced all of them to have sexual intercourse with him. In 
two of these rapes, he threatened the victims with a knife. While on appeal bond for his 
1962 rapes, Young entered another woman's home, exposed himself with her child 
present, and threatened to hurt the child and rape and kill the woman. Young was scared 
away before he could act out his threats. He was charged with attempted rape, but was 
held incompetent and was never tried. In 1972, Young was released on parole. Five 
years later, he was convicted of another rape after breaking into another woman's home. 
Young was released from prison in 1980 and again, five years later, forced his way into 
an apartment and raped another woman while three small children were present. Id 
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unanimously concluded that Young was a sexually violent predator.69 
Since his conviction, Young has been confined at the DSHS facility. 
Unlike Young, Cunningham had been a free man for more than four 
months, without incident, before prosecutors filed a personal restraint 
petition against him. In Cunningham's ex parte proceeding, the judge 
found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant after reviewing two 
psychological evaluations and Cunningham's history of sexual crimes.70 
At Cunningham's trial, the jury again heard conflicting testimony from 
the opposing parties' expert witnesses, testimony from Cunningham's 
previous rape victims, his prior criminal history, and Cunningham's own 
testimony. After being instructed that unanimity was not required, the 
jury returned an eleven-to-one verdict concluding that Cunningham was 
a sexually violent predator.71 
A. Nature of Sexually Violent Predators Law 
In order to resolve the appellants' challenges that their constitutional 
protection against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy were violated 
by the SVP law, the court sought to determine whether the law was civil 
or criminal in nature. Generally, the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto 
Clauses are only held applicable to punitive statutes. Once a court 
establishes that a statute is civil in nature, the double jeopardy and ex 
post facto challenges no longer apply.72 In Young, the majority opinion 
first looked to the language of the statute and its legislative history, then 
to the purpose and effect of the statutory scheme, in order to determine 
whether the SVP law was civil or criminal in nature.73 The court noted 
that the legislature's intent to create a civil rather than criminal statute 
was evidenced by the statute's plain language, which calls for a civil 
69. Id at 994-95. 
70. Id at 995. Cunningham was 26 years old at the time of the petition for his 
commitment as a sexual predator. When he was 15 years old, he jumped out of some 
bushes in a park and brandished a knife towards a woman and her three children. He 
fled when the woman screamed. Cunningham later admitted that he intended to force 
the woman to have oral sex with him. Four years later, he raped a woman hitchhiker 
after striking her several times and threatening to kill her. He was sentenced to 31 
months in prison. In 1987, three months after his November 1986 release, he grabbed 
a woman and forced her to have anal intercourse. In April of 1987, he assaulted another 
woman in a like manner. Cunningham was convicted for both rapes. Id 
71. Id at 995-96. 
72. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (deciding ex post facto 
issues on civil versus criminal distinctions); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-
48 (1989) (deciding double jeopardy issues based on punitive nature of proposed 
scheme). 
73. Young, 857 P.2d at 996 (citing two-part analysis from United States v. Ward, 
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). 
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system of committing sexual predators. The legislative history of the 
statute, the court claimed, also indicated a "clear intent" to create a civil 
scheme.74 
Next, the court interpreted Allen v. Illinois,75 a 1986 United States 
Supreme Court decision, to resolve the question of whether the actual 
impact of the SVP law was civil or criminal. 76 In Allen, the Court 
held, in a five-to-four decision, that proceedings under the Illinois 
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were not criminal in nature and, 
therefore, the sex offender could not claim a privilege against compulso-
ry self-incrimination.77 The Allen Court stated that even if a legislature 
expressly provides that a statute shall be civil in nature, the defendant 
has the opportunity to present the "clearest proof' that the scheme is "so 
punitive either in purpose or effect" that it must be considered crimi-
nal. 78 The Court found the following facts persuasive: the Illinois 
Supreme Court had interpreted the statute as civil in nature; under the 
statute, the state has an obligation to provide sex offenders care and 
treatment in a special facility; and the court is obliged to discharge the 
offender once he or she is no longer dangerous. 79 Based upon these 
factors, the Allen Court held that the appellants had failed to meet their 
burden of proving that the statute was essentially criminal punish-
ment. 80
Contrary to the appellants' challenges, the Young court cited the 
similarities between the Illinois and Washington sex offender schemes 
and upheld the SVP's civil stature. The Young court ruled that the 
Washington scheme is not focused on punishing offenders, but instead 
on providing treatment and protecting society. 81 The Young court 
74. Id. at 996-97. The court cited the Governor's Task Force on Community 
Protection as support for this proposition, namely the Task Force's recommendation that 
a special system of civil commitment be legislated due to the failings of the state's 
prevailing criminal justice and civil commitment systems. Id. 
75. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
76. Young, 857 P.2d at 997. 
77. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. By doing so, Allen implicitly upheld the Illinois sex 
offender civil commitment statute, which is similar to Washington's SVP statute. See 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205 (1994). 
78. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash. 1993). 
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relied on the United States Supreme Court's assertion in Addington v. 
Texas82 that 
[t]he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing 
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for 
themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the 
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. 83 
The Young court concluded that the stated goals and intentions of the 
legislature to create a civil system were dispositive because there was 
insufficient proof of a punitive or illegitimate civil goal.84 According-
ly, the court held that the commitment scheme was civil in nature and 
that the ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges were therefore 
inapplicable. 85 However, it appears that the Young majority sidestepped 
some important differences between the Washington statute and the 
Illinois statute that could greatly affect the analysis of the nature of the 
SVP law. First, the Illinois statute instructs that only after a criminal 
charge is pending may a prosecutor seek to civilly commit the offend-
er. 86 Second, under the Illinois law, prosecutors may not first seek 
criminal penalties and then bring another action seeking commitment 
based upon the same incident.87 Washington's SVP statute is simply 
not driven by the same civil goal of providing treatment in lieu of 
punishment. "[O]nly after the individual has completed his or her 
sentence does the [Washington] Statute purportedly seek to provide 
specialized 'care and treatment' for the individual."88 
Although there are some significant differences between the Illinois 
statute and Washington's SVP law, the United States Supreme Court 
would likely uphold the SVP law as civil in nature, because 
Washington's commitment scheme appears to have the legitimate goals 
of protecting society and treating offenders. Thus, the Court would 
likely deny the appellants' ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges. 
This forecast is also based upon the Court's Allen decision, the present 
conservative make-up of the Court, and the fact that the SVP law 
82. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
83. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 
(1979)). 
84. Id at 998-99. 
85. Id at 999. 
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205/3 (1994). The critical difference is that in 
Washington, civil commitment may be initiated after the individual has already served 
a lengthy criminal sentence. In Illinois, the individual must perpetrate a new offense and 
the prosecutor must, after some investigation, decide whether to divert the individual for 
treatment rather than criminal prosecution. 
87. People v. Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
88. Young, 857 P.2d at 1025 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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disavows an interest in punishment, provides treatment, and provides 
procedures to effectuate release. 
B. Substantive Due Process 
Opponents of the Sexually Violent Predator law claim that the statute 
violates the substantive due process rights of the accused because the law 
does not serve a valid state interest and it imprisons individuals who are 
not mentally ill. 89 Section III.B.1. considers the competing interests 
between the individual and the state and strictly scrutinizes the SVP law 
and the Young court's analysis of that law. Section III.B.2. focuses on 
arguably the greatest obstacle to the SVP scheme: the Washington 
Legislature's vague definition of "mental abnormality." 
1. Strict Scrutiny of Washington 's Statute 
An individual's interest in liberty is a fundamental concept of Anglo-
American law. When the government seeks to infringe on this 
fundamental right, the courts are empowered to strictly scrutinize the 
statute to ensure that the state's interests are compelling and that the 
statute is narrowly drawn to accomplish those interests.90 
Although the Young court proclaimed that "it is irrefutable that the 
State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and 
protecting society from their actions,"91 this statement may be only 
partially supportable. Unquestionably, the government has a strong 
interest in protecting the public from dangerous, mentally ill sex 
offenders. However, how can the state possess a compelling interest in 
treating sex offenders when effective treatment, according to the statute 
itself, simply does not exist?92 This appears to be a counter-intuitive 
proposition. In response, some argue that efficacy of treatment is not a 
constitutional requirement.93 If this argument is correct, the Young 
89. Id at 1000. 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987). 
91. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000. 
92. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
"[S]exually violent predators generally have antisocial personality features which are 
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities .... [T]he prognosis for 
curing sexually violent offenders is poor .... " Id 
93. Professor Brooks asserted: 
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court's reliance on "treatment" is an unnecessary fiction. Alternatively, 
if effective treatment is constitutionally required, what level of effective-
ness would satisfy the Due Process Clause? Justifying a precise level of 
accomplishment for psychiatric treatment is not only difficult, it may be 
impossible. For some mental defects, there are established modes of 
treatment that can be followed, whereas for others, such as violent sex 
offenders, there is simply no known, effective solution. Constitutionally 
demanding a substantive and successful treatment program where one 
does not exist would be irrational. Therefore, the most equitable 
solution would be to require the state to provide "reasonable" psychiatric 
treatment regardless of efficacy until such time as an effective treatment 
is discovered. In sexual predator cases, the required treatment should 
not focus on effectiveness, but on its undertaking and availability. The 
Young court acknowledged this reality.94 By providing the sexual 
predator with individualized care, treatment, and special confinement 
conditions at the DSHS facility,95 the SVP law probably meets the 
requisite level of treatment required by the Constitution.96 The state's 
interests in protecting society and treating offenders are of such a quality 
that they would satisfy the "compelling state interest" prong of the strict 
scrutiny test. 
In order to pass the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, the statute 
must also be drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the state's 
interests. The appellants in Young successfully argued that the SVP law 
[I]f the [Sexually Violent Predators] statute is perceived as primarily a 
'treatment program,' and if treatment is not likely to work, there appears to be 
a massive hypocrisy if violent sexual offenders are confined, ostensibly to treat 
them, when the likelihood of success is remote .... But it must be recognized 
that the goal of the ... statute is not primarily treatment. The statute is 
designed to confine an extremely limited number of dangerous and mentally 
abnormal persons because they are too dangerous to be at large .... It is not 
[constitutionally] necessary that treatment be efficacious. 
Brooks, supra note 19, at 735. 
94. The court remarked: 
[T]he mere fact that an illness is difficult to treat does not mean that it is not 
an illness. For example, some forms of schizophrenia cannot be treated, but 
the diagnosis nonetheless remains a valid one. The Legislature should not be 
admonished for its honest recognition of the difficulties inherent in treating 
those afflicted with the mental abnormalities causing the sex predator 
condition. 
Young, 857 P.2d at 1003. 
95. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 275-155-030 to 050 (1994). 
96. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) (stating that confinement 
for a sexual psychopath is unlike that for a felon because the state provides special 
treatment and psychiatric care); cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) 
(holding that a mentally retarded individual has constitutionally protected liberty interests 
in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily 
restraints, and minimally adequate training). 
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violated this second prong because it did not afford consideration of less 
restrictive alternatives to confinement. 97 However, the Young court 
resolved this problem by reading into the statute the need for courts to 
consider whether less restrictive alternatives are feasible on a case-by-
case basis.98 In its efforts to conform the SVP statute to Washington's 
existing short-term mental health commitment statute, the Young
majority's penmanship frustrates the legislature's stated intent99 and 
fails to conform to its own analysis. 100 Although the court correctly 
decided that the SVP law violated the appellants' substantive due process 
rights by not considering less restrictive alternatives, it should have left 
any proposed changes for the legislature. By playing the role of a super-
legislature, the court failed to apply the second prong of the strict 
scrutiny test-whether the statute as a whole is narrowly tailored to 
achieve its ends. 101 The SVP law's sweeping authority to snatch 
97. Young, 857 P.2d at 1012. The court stated that the SVP statute violates equal 
protection principles because Washington's existing mental health commitment statute 
requires the consideration of less restrictive alternatives. "The State cannot provide 
different procedural protections for those.confined under the sex predator statute unless 
there is a valid reason for doing so." Id For a more thorough discussion of the equal 
protection claims, see infra notes 122-41, 146-57 and accompanying text. 
98. Id 
99. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
100. The majority stated: "Given the nature of sexually violent predators, it would 
not be safe to house them in a less secure setting .... [T]he dangerousness of committed 
sex predators justifies a secure confinement facility." Young, 857 P.2d at 1005. Later, 
the majority flip-flopped and stated: "Here, the State offers no justification for not 
considering less restrictive alternatives under [Washington's mental health commitment 
statute] and denying the same under [the SVP law]." Id at 1012. The court's call for 
less restrictive alternatives cannot be harmonized with its stated belief that sexual 
predators are so dangerous that they should be kept in a special maximum security 
facility. 
101. See id at 1012. The Young court concedes that the statute is not narrowly 
drawn when it proclaims that "[n]ot all sex predators present the same level of danger, 
nor do they require identical treatment conditions .... [I]t is necessary to account for 
these differences by considering alternatives to total confinement." Id This commenta-
tor urges not only consideration of these alternatives, but codification of these 
alternatives to avoid inequitable, unjust, and unconstitutional results. 
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individuals from society is unnecessarily broad102 and would not pass 
a properly administered strict scrutiny test. 
2. Mental Illness, Dangerousness, and Preventative Detention 
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires a 
finding of both dangerousness and mental illness before a state in a civil 
proceeding can commit a person involuntarily to a mental facility. 103 
Opponents of the SVP scheme claim that Washington's law mandates 
unconstitutional preventative detention because some sex offenders, who 
do not suffer from a mental illness that is recognized by psychiatry, will 
be committed and also because psychiatry cannot accurately predict 
dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism. 104 The United States 
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Foucha v. Louisiana105 provides 
guidance on what magnitude of mental incapacity and dangerousness is 
constitutionally required. 
In Foucha, the Court reviewed a Louisiana statute that permitted the 
confinement of an insanity acquittee on the grounds that the individual 
in question was dangerous and had some lack of mental health. After 
being found not guilty of aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of 
a firearm by reason of insanity, Foucha was committed to a mental 
hospital in Louisiana. 106 Three and one-half years later, a review panel 
recommended that Foucha be conditionally discharged because he no 
longer suffered from the drug-induced psychosis that impelled his 
commitment. 107 At a subsequent hearing, court-appointed doctors 
testified that although the defendant showed no signs of mental illness, 
Foucha did display an antisocial personality. The doctors added that 
they could not comfortably state whether Foucha would pose a danger 
to himself or others. 108 Based on this testimony, the trial court found 
Foucha dangerous to himself or others and ordered him recommitted to 
102. For example, the legislature's definition of "mental abnormality" is circular 
and can be manipulated to incarcerate individuals with quite mild mental problems. 
Mental abnormality, as vaguely defined by the legislature, unnecessarily exposes many 
to confinement who do not exhibit traits of traditional mental illness. 
The broad scope of Washington's SVP law is also evidenced by the fact that its 
qualifying crimes range from one extreme, murder-rape, all the way down to attempted 
sexually motivated burglary. Young, 857 P.2d at 1024 (Johnson, J., dissenting), 
103. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 425-27 (1979). 
104. Bochnewich, supra note 63, at 283. 
105. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
106. Id. at 73-74. 
107. Id. at 74. 
108. Id. at 74-75. The doctors also cited a number of altercations Foucha had with 
other patients at the hospital. Id. 
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the mental hospital. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the decision 
and the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 109 
Justice White wrote the Court's plurality opinion, which held that the 
Louisiana scheme violated Foucha's substantive due process, procedural 
due process, and equal protection rights. 110 The Court flatly rejected 
Louisiana's assertion that diagnosis of an "antisocial personality" could 
satisfy the mental illness requirement imposed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.m Because Foucha suffered 
from no mental illness, the Court declared his continued civil confine-
ment unconstitutional. 
According to the Young court, its holding-that Washington's 
commitment scheme comports with the mental illness and dangerousness 
requirements of the Due Process Clause- is in accord with the Foucha 
decision. 112 The Young majority said the Louisiana civil commitment 
statute was struck down because the state attempted to continue the 
defendant's commitment when he only displayed an antisocial personali-
ty rather than a mental illness. The court observed that an antisocial 
personality is formally designated by psychiatrists as "antisocial 
behavior" and, therefore, is not a mental disorder or illness. 113 In 
contrast, the SVP legislation requires a current finding of either a 
"personality disorder," that is, a disorder recognized by psychiatric 
medicine, or a "mental abnormality" before permitting civil commit-
ment. 114 "Mental abnormality" is not a psychiatric term, but is 
legislatively defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the 
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person 
a menace to the health and safety of others." 115 The court acknowl-
edged that by "using the concept of 'mental abnormality' the Legislature 
109. Id at 75. 
110. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
111. Id at 75-80. Because "Foucha is not suffering from a mental disease or illness 
... he should not be held as a mentally ill person." Id at 79. The state may civilly 
confine a person if it shows that "the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. Here, the 
State has not carried that burden." Id at 80 (citation omitted). 
112. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1006 (Wash. 1993). 
113. Id. at 1006-07 n.12. The court relied on the American Psychiatric 
Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders for its 
psychiatric definitions. 
114. Id. 
115. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
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has invoked a more generalized terminology that can cover a much 
larger variety of disorders."116 The Young court believed that "mental 
abnormality" would be analogous to the Addington and Foucha mental 
illness prerequisite, provided that "psychiatric and psychological 
clinicians who testify in good faith as to mental abnormality are able to 
identify sexual pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other 
pathologies. " 117 
This analysis by the Young court is incomplete because it avoids the 
issue of what level of mental incapacity must be shown before the state 
is constitutionally permitted to civilly confine its citizens. 118Although 
mental health practitioners are most capable of diagnosing mental illness, 
the legislature and courts must be the ones to determine what level of 
mental incompetence is needed before constitutionally permitting civil 
commitment. The practical impact of the Young court's decision is that 
psychiatrists are bestow·ed not only with the power to determine future 
dangerousness, a sketchy proposition at best, 119but also the unbridled 
latitude to create any good faith argument that a mental disorder meets 
116. Young, 857 P.2d at 1001. 
117. Id. ( quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionalityand Morality of Civilly 
Committed Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 733 (1992). 
118. For example, the AP A currently classifies paraphilia ( a type of sexual disorder) 
as either mild, moderate, or severe. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC & 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-
III-R]. Following the court's expansive interpretation of"mental abnormality," a sex 
offender could be committed indefinitely for even a mild paraphilia as long as health 
care practitioners testify in good faith that the offender has an abnormality and that they 
believe the offender might be dangerous in the future. Is this enough to constitutionally 
warrant indefinite commitment? Although Washington has been cautious in selecting 
offenders with pronounced mental ailments, the court's flexible interpretation of"mental 
abnormality" and "personality disorder" opens a Pandora's box for future misuse and 
unconstitutional detention. 
119. According to one commentator: 
The state will attempt to [prove mental abnormality and dangerousness] by 
presenting psychiatrists and other mental health professionals who will testify 
that the person has the requisite abnormality and propensity to commit violent 
sex crimes. Even though these professionals cannot make reliable predictions 
concerning recidivism, this evidence is difficult to undermine for several 
reasons. The trier of fact ... is likely to find the testimony of specialists 
persuasive. Also, as the [American Psychiatric Association] observes, the 
adversely affected party will find it hard to challenge this testimony effective-
ly: 
Because most psychiatrists do not believe that they possess the expertise 
to make long-term predictions of dangerousness, they cannot dispute the 
conclusions of the few who do .... 
In a typical case, then, the defendant's inability to find a psychiatrist who will 
make the long-term prediction that the defendant will not be a recidivist 
cripples his or her defense. 
Gleb, supra note 6, at 233-34 ( citations omitted). 
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the statute's definition, regardless of whether the claimed disorder is 
recognized by contemporary psychiatry. 
Washington's definition of "mental abnormality" is too nebulous and 
imprecise to support the indefinite incarceration of an individual. The 
Young court did not place enough importance on Justice White's 
admonition in Foucha: 
[T]he State asserts that because Foucha once committed a criminal act and now 
has an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a 
disorder for which there is no effecti:ve treatment, he may be held indefinitely. 
This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely any other insanity 
acquittee not mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder 
that may lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted 
criminal, even though he has completed his prison term. It would also be only 
a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present 
system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible 
confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond 
reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law. 120 
Therefore, the definition of "mental abnormality" should be narrowed 
from the Young court's standard of "any good faith assertion" to include 
only pathologies and disorders that are recognized by mainstream 
psychiatry. Doing so will (1) provide guidance and limits to psychia-
trists, prosecutors, courts, and juries; (2) meet the constitutionally 
dictated mental illness requirement; and (3) lessen the possibility of 
erroneous confinement. Unfortunately, the Young court did not seize 
upon the opportunity to clarify Washington's "mental abnormality" 
definition and still find a mental illness from the facts in the case before 
it-both appellants had been diagnosed with a severe paraphilia, a sexual 
disorder currently recognized by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion. 121 
C. Procedural Due Process & Equal Protection 
The appellants and amicus curiae in Young argued that the SVP law 
is unconstitutional because it violates the rights granted to the appellants 
120. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992). 
121. Young, 857 P.2d at 1002. The AP A defines paraphilia as a sexual disorder that 
features "recurrent intense sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies generally 
involving either (1) nonhuman objects, (2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or 
one's partner (not merely simulated), or (3) children or other nonconsenting persons." 
Id. (quoting DSM-III-R, supra note 118, at 279). 
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by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 122 In particular, the petitioners maintained that these 
rights were violated because the law authorizes ex parte hearings, 
permits non-unanimous jury verdicts, and denies accused predators the 
right to remain silent. 123 Although the SVP law arguably possesses 
some of these alleged procedural deficiencies, it is unlikely that any of 
these deficiencies rise to the level of constitutional violations, because 
the SVP law meets all of the applicable constitutional standards for an 
individual to be involuntarily civilly committed. 
Before an individual may be committed, a state must show, in a 
sufficiently reliable manner, that the goal it seeks to achieve outweighs 
the individual's interest in not being involuntarily confined.124 Due 
process requires that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable 
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed125 and 
that involuntary commitment continue only so long as there is a 
constitutional basis for it. 126 Three distinct factors must be considered 
in the procedural due process balancing test: (I) the private interest, (2) 
the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional or substitute 
safeguards, and (3) the government's interest. 127 The state must 
shoulder the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence, a 
"middle level" of proof that is higher than the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, but lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard. 128 In addition to these due process requirements, equal 
protection requires that any distinction made between groups of people 
must have some rational relation to the purpose for which the distinction 
is made. 129 
Involuntary civil commitment is a serious infringement on an 
individual's liberty interest130 and can lead to significant, "adverse 
social consequences."131 Because of this, the state is constitutionally 
122. Id at 1009. 
123. Id 
124. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). 
125. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). 
126. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-78 (1992). The court applied the 
reasoning from its earlier decisions in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 
(1975), and Jones, 463 U.S. at 368, 370. 
127. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
128. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33. 
129. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). In a subsequent case, the 
Supreme Court applied the Baxtromrationale and held that sexual psychopaths could not 
be denied due process protections accorded the mentally ill without citing some sort of 
characteristic applicable to sex offenders that would make the denial of protections 
sensible. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 512 (1972). 
130. Jones, 463 U.S. at 361. 
13 I. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26. 
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permitted to deprive an individual of liberty only in certain narrow 
circumstances and only after invoking an array of procedural safe-
guards.132 These circumstances exist when the state, under its police 
power, seeks to commit an individual who suffers from a mental illness 
and is dangerous. 133 The severe consequences associated with errone-
ous, indefinite commitment necessitate expanded procedures. Accord-
ingly, Washington's SVP Act has many procedural safeguards that 
conform to and even surpass those approved by the Foucha and Allen 
Courts. 134 However, due to the significant negative impact of a 
possibly indefinite period of confinement, it is important to scrutinize the 
Act's existing procedures, or lack thereof, that tend to abridge fairness 
or increase the possibility of erroneous commitment. 
The SVP statute allows court proceedings that exclude the charged 
individual from appearing during the probable cause hearing135 or 
other hearings during the forty-five day pretrial period.136 However, 
Washington's existing civil commitment statute for the mentally ill 
affords an individual the opportunity to be present at a probable cause 
hearing within seventy-two hours of detention and have a psychological 
evaluation within twenty-four hours of detention. 137 The petitioners 
in Young did not receive notice of the petition and the judicial determi-
nation of probable cause was made ex parte. 138 Furthermore, both 
were denied the opportunity to personally appear in court during the 
forty-five day pretrial period.139 Due to the fact that Washington has 
given these procedural rights to similarly situated mental health patients, 
the Young court construed the statute so as to provide accused sexual 
predators with the right to be present at a probable cause hearing 
132. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79-82 (1992). 
133. Id 
134. These include the right to a full adversarial proceeding, jury trial, legal 
representation, experts for psychological examinations, trial within 45 days after the 
filing of the petition, the state bearing the burden of the highest standard of proof, annual 
mental examinations, and procedures for petitioning for release. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.09.020-.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
135. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
136. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
137. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1010 (Wash. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.05.200-.210 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
138. Young, 857 P.2d at 1010. 
139. Id at 1009-10. 
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conducted within seventy-two hours of his or her detention. 140 The 
Young court construed the statute in this manner in order to ensure that 
the statute was constitutional. The United States Supreme Court is likely 
to agree that due process similarly requires notice and the opportunity 
to be promptly heard at a probable cause hearing: 141 
In Young the SVP statute was construed by one of the trial courts to 
allow a non-unanimous jury verdict. 142 Because the statute was silent 
on the issue, the Young court looked at the SVP law's burden of proof 
to determine the legislature's intent. 143 Based on the heightened 
burden of proof and the unanimity that is generally required by that 
standard, the court ruled that the legislature intended to include the need 
for a unanimous jury verdict in the statutory scheme. 144 Although the 
Supreme Court only requires that the state prove its case by clear and 
convincing evidence, 145 future commitment schemes would be wise to 
follow Washington's lead and adopt the highest standard of proof, as 
well as unanimity of verdicts, in order to increase fairness and dissipate 
the inherent risks of programs that endorse possible lifetime confine-
ments. 
Although the Washington Legislature purposely avoided incorporating 
an overt act requirement into the SVP law, the Young court held that a 
recent overt act is required for those individuals who were already free 
from prison, but not for individuals committed directly from prison. 146 
Recent overt act requirements were derived from the belief that the 
finding of a recent overt act would lend accuracy and objectivity to 
dangerousness predictions. Requiring a recent overt act in cases where 
140. Id. at 1011. The court then ruled that the failure to afford the petitioners these 
procedures had no bearing on the outcome and was therefore harmless error. Id. at 
1011-12. 
141. Although the Young court was bound by equal protection principles to choose 
a 72-hour period (mentally ill were permitted by statute to attend the probable cause 
hearing), the Supreme Court is likely to defer to state determinations of what is the 
proper period of time, whether the period is shorter or longer, within reason. See, e.g., 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that an arrestee is entitled 
to a prompt detention hearing). 
142. Young, 857P.2dat 1012. Cunningham'sjuryreturnedwithan 11-to-l verdict 
after the trial court did not instruct the jury that unanimity was required. Id. 
143. Id. In Addington, the Court remarked: "Increasing the burden of proof is one 
way to impress the fact finder with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps 
to reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments will be ordered." Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979). 
144. Young, 857 P.2d at 1012. Due to the fact that petitioner Cunningham was 
convicted based upon an 11-to-1 jury verdict, the court found the verdict "insufficient." 
However, petitioner Young was convicted based upon a unanimous jury verdict and, 
therefore, the court affirmed his jury's findings. Id. 
145. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33. 
146. Young, 857 P.2d at 1009. 
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the offender is in prison is not practicable because imprisoned offenders 
have "little or no opportunity to commit an overt sexually violent 
act."147 The Young court agreed that requiring prisoners to commit an 
overt sexually violent act would be illogical. 148 However, the court 
was constrained by existing case law149 and, therefore, read an overt 
act requirement into the SVP statute for individuals not incarcerated at 
the time a petition is filed against them. Absent a similarly restrictive 
precedent, other jurisdictions need not be likewise encumbered. Forcing 
prosecutors to prove a recent overt act before committing sexual 
predators, even those already free in the community, is tantamount to 
emasculating the main purpose behind any sexual predator legislation: 
societal protection. It is reprehensible to wait for another sexual assault 
to occur before taking action when there is ample proof that the 
individual in question is mentally ill, has prior violent sex offense 
convictions, and is likely to re-offend. Requiring an overt act of 
violence before permitting involuntary commitment of either imprisoned 
or already released offenders is an unreasonable burden because 
requiring evidence of a single overt act adds little or nothing to ensure 
an accurate prediction of future dangerousness. 150 Psychiatrists believe 
that they are competent at predicting future behavior even without 
evidence of a recent overt act. 151 Because overt act prerequisites do 
not increase the reliability of predicting future dangerousness, sexual 
predators derive no due process benefit from the added "protection."152 
If a jurisdiction does require an overt act, the legislature should opt to 
reshape its definition to include overt physical manifestations as well as 
any credible evidence of dangerousness, including correspondence, notes, 
147. Brooks, supra note 19, at 751. "[D]uring confinement these offenders do not 
have access to potential victims and therefore will not engage in an overt act during 
confinement." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
148. Young, 857P.2dat 1008-09. WhenCalifornia'ssexoffendercivil commitment 
system was in operation, a California appellate court also rejected the claim that due 
process required a recent overt act for prisoners: "Due process does not require that the 
absurd be done before a compelling state interest can be vindicated." People v. Martin, 
107 Cal. App. 3d 714, 725, 165 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (1980). 
149. See In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1982) (requiring an overt act before the 
state can commit a mentally disordered individual). 
150. See, e.g., Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (expert 
witnesses testified that evidence of one recent overt act does little, if anything, to sharpen 
the accuracy of a dangerousness prediction). 
151. Id. at 710-11. 
152. Brooks, supra note 19, at 751. 
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and statements made by the predator which exhibit a desire to commit 
future harm. 
The Young petitioners also argued that they were unconstitutionally 
denied the right to remain silent in violation of their Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination when they were ordered by the trial 
court to speak to the state's psychologists. 153 The petitioners' argu-
ments are likely to be insupportable because the Supreme Court held in 
Allen that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to non-criminal 
proceedings and that due process does not independently require 
application of the privilege. 154 A more persuasive argument is that 
equal protection mandates application of the privilege against self-
incrimination to sexual predators because Washington's mentally ill are 
granted the privilege. 155 Although the Young court casually dismissed 
the petitioners' equal protection claim, 156 the United States Supreme 
Court, if Foucha's plurality can gain a swing vote, should hold that 
sexual predators are indeed similarly situated to the mentally insane and 
that the state violated equal protection principles when it denied sexual 
predators the right to remain silent. 157 
153. Young, 857 P.2d at 1013. 
154. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986). 
155. Young, 857 P.2d at 1014. 
156. The Young majority's equal protection stance, which denied accused sexual 
predators the right to remain silent, is diametrically opposed to its equal protection 
analysis for the less restrictive alternatives to confinement requirement, supra text 
accompanying notes 97-102, and the recent overt act requirement, supra text accompany-
ing notes 146-48. Surprisingly, the court stated: 
[W]e see good reasons to refuse the statutory right to remain silent to sexually 
violent predators even though the Legislature has granted such a right to the 
mentally ill .... [S]exually violent predators are not similarly situated to the 
mentally ill in regard to the treatment methods employed, or the information 
necessary to ensure that they receive proper diagnosis and treatment. 
Young, 857 P.2d at 1014. The majority's treatment of the equal protection questions and 
its treatment of the due process questions are wholly inconsistent. Id at 1022 n.5 
(Johnson, J., dissenting). 
157. Foucha indicated that absent a convincing reason for the disparity in procedural 
rights between similarly situated groups (the Court cited the difference between insane 
persons who had the right to remain silent and a now sane acquittee who was denied that 
right), the law would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 
71, 84-86 (1992). Interestingly, the Young court denied the appellants' equal protection 
claims on the issue of the right to remain silent, whereas, earlier in its opinion, the court 
asserted that sexual predators and the mentally ill were indistinct groups deserving of 
the same rights to appear within 72 hours at probable cause hearings. See supra notes 
135-41 and accompanying text. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
California's "one strike" law will significantly increase the length of 
prison sentences for individuals who commit sex offenses in the future. 
However, the "one strike" law cannot protect Californians from 
dangerous sex offenders who are presently nearing release from prison 
or have already been released from prison. The character of our system 
of justice, based on individual liberty, should not be radically altered in 
order to prevent all sex offenders from committing sex crimes. 
Nevertheless, a subgroup of the sex offender population can be stopped. 
This subgroup-sexual predators-can be prevented from committing 
another rape, molestation, or murder. However, the only plausible way 
to adequately protect society and preserve our system's essence of 
freedom is through a narrowly drawn civil commitment statute. The 
Supreme Court has held that commitment is proper upon a finding of 
mental illness and dangerousness. Furthermore, principles of fairness, 
morality, and dignity require additional precautions. The "one strike" 
legislation took a considerable step forward in protecting society from 
sex offenders. Washington's SVP law took another step to protect its 
citizenry, but because of its vague definitions, unequal treatment of 
sexual predators, and potential for inconsistent and erroneous application, 
that law is ill-suited for California's populace. Furthermore, the SVP 
law fails to truly consider appropriate alternatives to indefinite confine-
ment and is likely to violate the offender's substantive due process 
rights. By enacting a more balanced civil commitment approach like 
that proposed by the Model Sexual Predators Act, which follows in the 
Appendix, California will maximize the protection of its citizenry while 
still safeguarding principles of fairness and the accused individual's 
interest in liberty. 
PETER A. ZAMOYSKI 
1277 
APPENDIX 
THE MODEL SEXUAL PREDATORS ACT (MSPA) 
§ 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE 
The Legislature finds that there is a small, but extremely dangerous, 
group of sexual predators whose mental defects and dangerousness 
render them inappropriate for confinement under the existing civil 
commitment act. The current criminal justice and short-term civil 
commitment systems cannot properly address the problem of sexual 
predators whose prison terms have expired, or are presently expiring, 
and who are still regarded as extremely dangerous. 
The Legislature expressly denounces any desire to punish the 
individuals' past actions. Individuals who are eligible for criminal 
prosecution for committing sexually violent offenses are not appropriate 
for inclusion under the provisions of this Act. This Act is intended to 
create a civil commitment system that provides a range of treatment 
plans and confinement alternatives in order to provide long-term care for 
sexual predators and, at the same time, promote the public's safety. 
COMMENTARY 
Section 1 of the MSPA 1 states that the existing criminal and civil 
commitment statutes are ineffective at stopping sexual predators. 
Although sentence enhancing laws, such as California's "one strike" law, 
greatly enhance the sentences for newly convicted sex offenders, the 
current criminal justice system is ineffective because it must wait for 
another offense to be perpetrated, even when there is significant 
evidence that a prior offender is still dangerous. 2 The current civil 
commitment scheme is ineffective because it is a short-term system 
designed for individuals who do not pose as serious a risk of violence. 
Additionally, sexual predators need special confinement and long-term 
treatment. 
1. MODEL SEXUAL PREDA TORS ACT [hereinafter MSP A]. The first paragraph of 
MSP A § 1 is an altered version of WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & 
Supp. 1995). 
2. The criminal justice system is usually appropriate only after a criminal offense 
has been committed. The exceptions to the rule occur when there is an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit the offense. Sexual predators who are nearing release from prison 
do not fit within these two exceptions. 
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Individuals eligible for criminal prosecution are inappropriate for civil 
commitment under the MSPA.3 This clause in section 1 is intended to 
inhibit prosecutors from using the civil system as an alternative to the 
criminal justice system. The Act's provisions are simply not intended 
to reach every accused sex offender. Because of effective sentence 
enhancing laws, such as the "one strike" law, only those prisoners who 
are nearing release, or have been recently released, and are still 
extremely dangerous should be considered for commitment under the 
civil system.4 
§ 2. DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of this Act, the terms defined in this section shall apply 
throughout the statute. 
(1) "Sexual Predator" means any person who: (a) has committed 
more than one sexually violent offense, (b) suffers from a mental illness, 
and ( c) poses a danger to commit future sexually violent offenses against 
the public. 
(2) "Sexually violent offense" means any criminal conviction or 
acquittal by reason of insanity for: 
(a) "Harmful sexual conduct" that resulted in serious physical or 
emotional harm to another. Harmful sexual conduct includes, but is not 
limited to, the following felonies: first or second degree rape, first or 
second degree rape by forcible compulsion, rape of a child under age 
fourteen, first or second degree sexual assault, first or second degree 
sexual assault of a child under age fourteen, indecent liberties by forcible 
compulsion, indecent liberties with a child under age fourteen, incest 
against a child under age fourteen, first or secorid degree child molesta-
tion, any felony sexual offense analogous to harmful sexual conduct as 
defined in this paragraph or any comparable federal or out-of-state 
3. The prohibition against including individuals subject to penal laws is derived 
in part from the Illinois statute, which forces a prosecutor to choose between a civil or 
criminal trial at the outset of the proceedings. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205/3 
( 1994). Under the Illinois system, a prosecutor may not first seek criminal penalties and 
then bring another action seeking commitment based upon the same incident. People v. 
Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). Under the MSPA, a prosecutor does not 
have the choice. If the individual is alleged to have committed a new offense, the 
prosecutor must bring criminal charges. 
4. The reason for limiting the scope of the Act is that prior sentences for sex 
offenders have been relatively short although the offenses were quite violent. See supra 
note 39. 
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felony sexual offense that would constitute harmful sexual conduct as 
defined in this paragraph; 
(b) "Sexually motivated offenses." This paragraph only applies to 
convictions of first or second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping, arson, first degree burglary, 
harassment, or stalking. In order for one of the crimes listed in this 
paragraph to satisfy the sexually violent offense prerequisite, the sexual 
motivation for the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
either at the time of sentencing for the crime or at the civil commitment 
proceedings; 
( c) Attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit 
any of the felony offenses described in paragraphs (a) or (b) of this 
subsection; or 
( d) "Deviant sexual conduct" that resulted in physical or emotional 
harm to another. Deviant sexual conduct is a sexual offense of lower 
culpability than harmful sexual conduct. Felony sexual offenses not 
otherwise covered under paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection fall 
within deviant sexual conduct. 
(3) "Mental illness" means any sexual, personal, or other mental 
illness, disorder, or dysfunction existing for no less than three months 
prior to the filing of the petition that is hereinafter provided. The 
illness, disorder, or dysfunction must be one recognized by mainstream 
psychiatric medicine. To determine the proper level of treatment and 
confinement, the individual's mental illness shall be classified as either 
mild, moderate, or severe. 
(4) "Danger to commit future sexually violent offenses" means the 
strong or very strong likelihood that an individual will engage in any of 
the sexually violent offenses defined in subsection (2) at some point in 
the future. 
(5) "Offenses against the public" means any acts directed towards 
strangers or individuals with whom a relationship has been established 
or promoted for the purpose of victimization. 
( 6) "Alternative housing facility" means any facility, such as a half-
way house, designed to treat, oversee, and restrict, but not totally 
confine, the movements of less menacing sexual predators. 
(7) "Secure facility" means a special maximum security facility, not 
located on the grounds of a state mental facility, with the purpose of 
confining, caring for, and treating sexual predators. 
(8) "Mental health professional" means any person certified or 
licensed in the State to practice as a mental health counselor, psychiatric 
nurse, psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker. 
(9) "Mental health evaluation" means a determination, by at least two 
qualified mental health professionals who have personally examined the 
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alleged sexual predator, of whether the individual suffers from a mental 
illness that makes it likely the individual will engage in future sexually 
violent offenses against the public. The evaluation shall include 
suggestions for the appropriate levels of confinement, care, and treatment 
and the anticipated duration of the necessary confinement, care, and 
treatment. 
COMMENTARY 
Section 2 is devoted to defining the relevant terms used throughout the 
Act. The definition of "Sexual Predator" under the MSPA5 is principal-
ly derived from other jurisdictions' commitment statutes,6 the case law 
of those jurisdictions, and this commentator's own insights.7 By 
requiring more than one conviction for a sexually violent offense, 8 
rather than merely being charged, the MSPA assures that the offender 
has at least some sort of proven history of recidivism that makes him or 
her worthy of these extraordinary measures.9 The MSPA's requirement 
of the presence of a mental illness for at least three months10 before 
permitting involuntary commitment is derived from the Foucha decision, 
the Illinois statute, and equal protection considerations. Foucha's 
plurality adhered to Addington, holding that civil commitment is 
5. MSPA § 2(1). 
6. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(18b) (West 1995); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 
205/1.01 (1994). 
7. E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 
1993); People v. Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
8. MSPA § 2(1)(a). 
9. For example, the Washington statute encompasses "any person who has been 
convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Minnesota's statute authorizes commitment 
after the person "has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct . . . that creates a 
substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm." MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 253B.02(7a), (18b) (West 1995). Perpetration of enumerated crimes leads to a 
"rebuttable presumption that [the] conduct described ... creates a substantial likelihood 
that a victim will suffer serious physical or emotional harm." MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 253B.02(7a) (West 1995). Both jurisdictions' statutes inherently allow for commitment 
of offenders who have not been criminally convicted of even one offense. However, 
Washington' sAttomey General reportedly requires a pattern of sexually violent behavior 
before a petition can be filed. See Brooks, supra text note 19, at 714-15. The MSPA 
codifies this requirement directly into its definition of "sexual predator." 
10. MSPA § 2(1)(b), (3). 
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appropriate only upon a finding of mental illness and dangerousness. 11 
Although the Court did not specify exactly what constitutes a mental 
illness, this commentator believes the Court will require, at the very 
least, that the dysfunction or disorder be one recognized by mainstream 
psychiatry, such as the American Psychiatric Association. 12 Requiring 
a recognized mental illness lends credibility to the commitment. The 
MSPA's three month period of mental illness was so chosen in order to 
exclude individuals who are experiencing only temporary mental 
imbalances. 13 Furthermore, the MSPA instructs the evaluating mental 
health professionals to classify the individual's mental illness as either 
mild, moderate, or severe. 14 This will compel evaluators to sharpen 
their diagnoses within reasonable parameters and provide all involved 
parties with a better assessment of the individual's mental illness. At the 
same time, the classification will enable the court to reach a more 
informed decision on the proper level of confinement. 
A verifiable mental illness is a prerequisite to any involuntary civil 
commitment. A civil commitment system that requires dangerousness 
without mental illness would be difficult to justify under an equal 
protection theory. Why would sex offenders be the only individuals 
dangerous enough to warrant civil commitment? What justification 
could there be for committing sex offenders but not other dangerous 
people, such as murderers?15 If dangerousness alone could justify civil 
commitment, our present system of punishment, which incarcerates 
individuals only upon violation of a criminal law, would be usurped and 
11. For a discussion of these requirements, see supra text accompanying notes 103-
21. 
12. Contra In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1001 (Wash. 1993) (allowing a finding of 
"mental abnormality" upon a good faith identification of mental pathology). 
13. Similarly, the Illinois statute calls for a mental disorder that exists for at least 
one year prior to the filing ofa petition. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205/1.01 (1994). 
The MSP A only requires three months as opposed to the Illinois one-year period of 
mental illness because of the MSPA's allowance for less restrictive confinement 
alternatives instead of across-the-board indefinite commitments. See MSP A§ 5.2. Also, 
because the MSP A is founded on the belief that sexual predators are not appropriate for 
short-term commitment, the three-month requirement assures proper use of the existing 
mental health and commitment system. 
14. MSPA § 2(3). 
15. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84-86 (1992). Justice White's 
dangerousness-equal protection argument can be easily applied to sexual predator civil 
commitment schemes: 
Id. 
Many [criminals] will likely suffer from the same sort of personality disorder 
that Foucha exhibits. However, state law does not allow for their continuing 
confinement based merely on dangerousness. Instead, the State controls the 
behavior of these similarly situated citizens by relying on other means, such 
as punishment, deterrence, and supervised release. 
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our nation's present system, which is based on individual liberty, would 
be ominously transformed into a police state. 
The MSPA, like other sex offender commitment statutes, includes the 
likelihood of dangerousness as a key element in determining whether an 
individual is a sexual predator. 16 Although many argue that psychiatric 
predictions of future dangerousness are too imprecise for civil commit-
ment statutes, 17 the Supreme Court is likely to uphold the use of these 
predictions. 18 Before permitting commitment, the MSPA requires a 
mental health professional to find not only that the individual is likely 
to engage in future sexually violent offenses, but that there is at least a 
strong likelihood of that occurrence. 19 Using the adjective "strong" 
implies a higher degree of belief, perhaps more than a fifty percent 
probability, ensuring that only those offenders believed to be a legitimate 
threat to commit new offenses are subject to involuntary confinement. 
§ 3 .1. REFERRAL TO PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 20 
( 1) When it appears that an individual may satisfy the definition of a 
sexual predator under MSPA section 2(1 ), the agency with jurisdiction 
16. MSPA § 2(l)(c). 
17. See, e.g., Gleb, supra text note 6; La Fond, supra text note 19, at 770-71. 
18. The Court has allowed dangerousness predictions in pretrial bail hearings, 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (upholding Bail Reform Act 
authorization of pretrial detention on basis of future dangerousness); in capital offense 
sentencing hearings, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 ( 1983); and implicitly in other sex 
offender civil commitment schemes, Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (upholding 
Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act). See also In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 
(Minn.) (upholding Minnesota's former Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act, 
repealed and recodified by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.0 1-.23 (West 1995)), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 146 (1994). The Court stated inFouchathat although psychiatry is an inexact 
science, 
such opinion is reliable enough to permit the courts to base civil commitments 
on clear and convincing medical evidence that a person is mentally ill and 
dangerous and to base release decisions on qualified testimony that the 
[individual] is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. It is also reliable enough 
for the State not to punish a person who by a preponderance of the evidence 
is found to have been insane at the time he committed a criminal act, to say 
nothing of not trying a person who is at the time found incompetent to 
understand the proceedings. 
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.3. Therefore, use of psychiatric predictions in the MSPA and 
other civil commitment statutes should easily withstand attack. 
19. See MSPA § 2(4). 
20. This section is based on WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.025 (West Supp. 
1995). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185(1) (West 1995). 
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over the individual shall refer the case, in writing, to the prosecuting 
attorney of the county where the individual was charged. When 
practicable, referrals shall occur at least three months prior to: 
(a) The anticipated release from confinement of a person previously 
convicted of a sexually violent offense as either an adult or a juvenile; 
(b) The release of a person who has been charged with a sexually 
violent offense but has been found incompetent to stand trial; or 
( c) The release of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity of 
a sexually violent offense. 
(2) As used in this section, "agency with jurisdiction" encompasses 
any agency with the authority to direct the release of a person serving 
a sentence or term of confinement and includes the departments of 
corrections and social and health services. 
§ 3.2. SEXUAL PREDATOR PETITION; FILING 
(1) If it appears that an individual may be a sexual predator and good 
cause exists for that belief, the prosecuting attorney for the county where 
the individual was convicted or charged, or the attorney general if 
requested by the prosecuting attorney, may file a petition with the court 
alleging that the individual is a sexual predator and stating facts 
sufficient to support that allegation, provided that: 
(a) The term of confinement of a person previously convicted of a 
sexually violent offense as either an adult or juvenile is about to expire 
or has expired; 
(b) A person who has been charged with a sexually violent offense, 
but has been found incompetent to stand trial, is about to be or has been 
released; or 
( c) A person found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually 
violent offense is about to be or has been released. 
(2) A copy of the petition shall be served upon the individual, unless 
the prosecuting attorney or attorney general shows just cause for an ex 
parte judicial determination of probable cause. 
COMMENTARY 
Section 3.2 elaborates on Washington's petition filing system.21 
Most notably, the MSPA adds a provision requiring service of pro-
cess. 22 Serving the petition on the individual, unless the prosecutor can 
show a good reason for not doing so, gives the individual notice that the 
21. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
22. Minnesota's commitment statute has a somewhat similar notice requirement. 
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07(4) (West 1995). 
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State is seeking to take away his liberty. This allows the individual time 
to take appropriate steps, such as retaining an attorney or disputing the 
contents of the petition. 
§ 3.3. PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION 
Within forty-eight hours of filing the petition under MSPA section 3 .2, 
a judge shall determine in a hearing whether probable cause for the 
charge exists. The alleged predator has the right to attend the hearing, 
have counsel present, and challenge the prosecuting attorney's assertion, 
unless the prosecuting attorney or attorney general has shown just cause 
for an ex parte judicial determination. If the judge determines that 
probable cause exists, the court shall issue an arrest warrant, when 
necessary, and the individual shall be taken into custody for an initial 
mental health examination. 
COMMENTARY 
After a petition is filed under the MSPA, the individual is permitted 
a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours and other significant 
procedural protections. 23 Although the protections listed in section 3 .3 
may not be required by due process,24 the stigma attached to commit-
ment as a sexual predator and the seriousness of the charge mandate 
reasonable procedural safeguards. From a morality and fairness 
perspective, it is not unreasonable to allow a probable cause hearing 
within forty-eight hours because similar hearings are common for 
criminal charges. Likewise, permitting the alleged predator to appear in 
court to refute the charges increases the chances of a fair hearing and 
assures the individual the best opportunity to preserve his right to remain 
free from confinement. The MSPA's procedures and protections are 
aimed at providing reasonable, workable safeguards that protect the 
charged individual without handcuffing the State.25 
23. MSP A § 3 .3. Minnesota requires a hearing within 14 days, but the individual 
may demand an immediate hearing. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.08(1) (West 1995). 
Washington's statute simpl;y states that the judge shall determine whether probable cause 
exists"[u]ponthe filingofa petition." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.040 (West 1992 
& Supp. 1995). 
24. For a discussion of the appropriate procedural due process analysis, see supra 
text accompanying notes 122-57. 
25. See, e.g., MSPA §§ 3.3-4.2. After commitment, the sexual predator is afforded 
additional rights, such as yearly mental health evaluations, individualized treatment plans, 
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§ 3.4. INITIAL EXAMINATION26 
When the court finds probable cause for a sexually violent predator 
petition under MSPA section 3.3, the individual shall be taken into 
custody and transferred to an appropriate facility, as determined by 
social services, for a mental health evaluation as defined by MSPA 
section 2(9) within forty-five days of the petition filing date. The 
department shall then provide the court, the prosecuting attorney, and the 
individual with its written recommendation of whether the individual 
meets the statutory definition of a sexual predator under MSPA section 
2(1). 
§ 4.1. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 27 
The alleged sexual predator has the following rights throughout the 
proceedings: 
(1) The right to be represented by legal counsel or have legal counsel 
appointed if the individual cannot afford counsel; 
(2) The right to retain qualified mental health practitioners to perform 
examinations on the individual or have qualified mental health practitio-
ners appointed if the individual cannot afford such assistance; the right 
to reasonable access to all relevant medical and psychological records 
and reports; 
(3) The right to be present, with counsel, at any of the commitment 
proceedings, unless good cause is shown for an ex parte hearing; 
( 4) The right to reasonable access to consult with counsel, to be 
examined by qualified mental health professionals, and to prepare a 
proper defense; 
(5) The right to a trial within forty-five days after the filing of a 
petition pursuant to MSPA section 3 .2; the right to a twelve-person jury, 
to testify, to present witnesses on his or her behalf, and to a unanimous 
verdict; 
( 6) The right to remain silent; and 
(7) The right against self-incrimination. 
and the keeping of personal belongings. See MSPA § 7.1-.2. 
26. The influence for this section came from WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 
(West 1992 & Supp. 1995). A 45-day deadline and service of the written recommenda-
tion to all parties was incorporated by this author. 
27. The rights listed in MSPA § 4.1 originated principally from WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 275-155-050 (1994), as well as other civil commitment statutes. 
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Section 4.1 ( 6) grants the individual the right to remain silent and 
section 4.1(7) grants the individual the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Both the Washington Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court have held that the Constitution does not extend these 
rights to sex offenders in civil proceedings.28 However, the extension 
of these rights does not truly hamper prosecutions,29 though conceded-
ly, the determination of whether the person is a sexual predator would 
be facilitated by the individual's cooperation and would perhaps even 
benefit the individual. Allowing the alleged sexual predator these rights 
will encourage the State to remain fair and evenhanded. 
§ 4.2. RIGHTS OF PARTIES 30 
(1) For good cause shown, the court may extend time for trial up to 
an additional thirty days. 
(2) Unless trial is commenced within forty-five days :from the petition 
filing date, the petition .shall be automatically discharged and the 
individual :freed :from the treatment facility, absent an extension of time 
under subsections (1) or (3) of this section. Nothing in this subsection 
28. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 
(1986). This commentator believes that if a jurisdiction extends these rights in other 
civil commitment settings, it should do likewise for sexual predators. The Allen court 
stated that the Fifth Amendment's rights are intended to curb improper extraction of 
confessions, not to enhance reliability, and even ifit were intended to enhance reliability, 
that it is "plausible ... that denying the evaluating psychiatrist the opportunity to 
question persons alleged to be sexually dangerous would decrease the reliability of a 
finding of sexual dangerousness." Allen, 478 U.S. at 374-75. However, as the dissent 
pointed out, the Court overlooked the equal protection argument that because Illinois' 
mentally ill were afforded the rights under the Fifth Amendment and sexually dangerous 
persons are similarly situated to the mentally ill, they should also be granted the Fifth 
Amendment rights. Id at 380-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
29. The prosecution can still use other sources to make its case, such as past mental 
health evaluations, criminal history, school and juvenile records, and other witnesses. 
For example, even though the Young majority claimed that "cooperation with the 
diagnosis and treatment procedures is essential," Young refused to speak to the state's 
psychologists and was still declared a sexual predator by a unanimous jury. Young, 857 
P.2d at 995, 1013-14. 
30. The majority of this section is attributed to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.08(1) 
(West 1995) and partially attributed to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.050 (West 1992 
& Supp. 1995). 
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creates a right to freedom if the individual's confinement can be 
continued on an alternative basis. 
(3) On demand and for good cause shown, the court may extend time 
for trial an additional ten days. 
(4) The prosecuting attorney or attorney general, the judge, or the 
individual has the right to demand that trial be held before a twelve-
person jury. If no demand is made, the trial shall be before the court. 
(5) The prosecuting attorney or attorney general may move to dismiss 
the petition without prejudice at any time during the proceedings prior 
to a final judgment being rendered. 
§ 5.1. TRIAL 31 
(1) The proceedings under this Act shall be civil in nature. However, 
due to the individual's strong liberty interest and the stigma attached to 
a sexual predator conviction, the individual is entitled to procedures 
normally required in criminal proceedings, including the highest standard 
of proof, rules of evidence, constitutional rights, and unanimity of 
verdict. Before trial, the prosecuting attorney shall have the right to 
have the petitioner examined by at least one expert or mental health 
professional of his or her choice. At trial, the finder of fact shall 
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the individual is a sexual 
predator, as defined in MSPA section 2. To reach that conclusion, the 
court or jury must find that the individual's propensity to commit future 
sexually violent offenses is causally linked to the individual's mental 
illness. 
(2) If the individual is found to be a sexual predator, the finder of fact 
shall specify whether the sexual predator's mental illness is mild, 
moderate, or severe and whether the likelihood that the predator will 
engage in future sexually violent offenses is strong or very strong. 
(3) In cases where the individual is found incompetent to stand trial 
for a sexually violent offense, absent a prior judicial finding, the court 
must determine whether the individual did commit the act in question 
before considering whether the individual should be committed pursuant 
to this Act. The hearing under this subsection shall have the same 
substantive and procedural protections found in subsection ( 1 ), except for 
the right not to be tried while incompetent. 
31. This section is based on a combination of WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.09.050-.060 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, paras. 
205/3.01, 4, 5 (1994). 
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§ 5.2. COMMITMENT ALTERNATIVES GUIDELINES32 
The court shall determine the proper restriction on the individual's 
freedom after the finder of fact has satisfied its duties under MSPA 
sections 5.1(1)-(2). The court may choose from the following restric-
tions on freedom based upon the individual's prior convictions of 
sexually violent offenses, the severity of the individual's mental illness, 
and the likelihood of the individual's future dangerousness: 
(1) Indefinite Commitment to Secure Facility. This subsection shall 
apply to predators who have been found to have more than two 
convictions of prohibited conduct listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-
( c ), a severe mental illness, and a very strong likelihood of engaging in 
future sexually violent offenses against the public. 
(2) Thirty-Six Month Commitment to Secure Facility. This subsection 
shall apply to predators who have been found to have at least two 
convictions of prohibited conduct listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) 
or a combination of one conviction of prohibited conduct listed under 
MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) and at least two prior convictions of deviant 
sexual conduct, a moderate or severe mental illness, and a very strong 
likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent offenses. 
(3) Eighteen Month Commitment to Secure Facility. 
(a) This subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to 
have at least one conviction of a sexually violent offense listed under 
MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) or more than two convictions of deviant 
sexual conduct, a severe mental illness, and a strong or very strong 
likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent offenses. 
(b) This subsection shall also apply to predators who have been found 
to have at least one conviction of a sexually violent offense listed under 
MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) or more than two convictions of deviant 
sexual conduct, a mild or moderate mental illness, and a very strong 
likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent offenses. 
(4) Nine Month Commitment to Secure Facility. This subsection shall 
apply to predators who have been found to have at least one conviction 
of a sexually violent offense listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) or 
more than two convictions of deviant sexual conduct, a mild or moderate 
32. The guidelines proposed in this section were created by the author; they were 
roughly inspired by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, 
GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1994). 
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mental illness, and a strong likelihood of engaging in future sexually 
violent offenses. 
(5) Twenty-Four Month Commitment to Alternative Housing Facility. 
This subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to have 
at least one conviction of a sexually violent offense listed under MSPA 
section 2, but no more than two convictions listed under MSPA sections 
2(2)(a)-(c), if it appears to the court, after a favorable recommendation 
by the secretary of social services and in light of the circumstances, that 
the predator's admission to the alternative housing facility will not 
expose the public to an unreasonable risk; a mild or moderate mental 
illness; and a strong likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent 
offenses. The court may order any additional restraints on the predator's 
movements that the court deems necessary to better treat the predator or 
protect the public. 
(6) Twelve Month Commitment to Alternative Housing Facility. This 
subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to have at least 
one conviction of a sexually violent offense, but no more than two 
convictions listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c), or no more than one 
conviction listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) with three convictions 
of deviant sexual conduct, if it appears to the court, after a favorable 
recommendation by the secretary of social services and in light of the 
circumstances, that the predator's admission to the alternative housing 
facility will not expose the public to an unreasonable risk; a mild or 
moderate mental illness; and a strong likelihood of engaging in future 
sexually violent offenses. Under this subsection, the court may order 
any additional restraints on the predator's movements that the court 
deems necessary to better treat the predator or protect the public. 
(7) Less Restrictive Commitment Alternatives. 
(a) This subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to 
have at least one conviction of deviant sexual conduct as defined by 
MSPA section 2(2)(d), but no more than four such convictions, if it 
appears to the court, after a favorable recommendation by the secretary 
of social services and in light of the circumstances, that the predator's 
eligibility under this subsection will not expose the public to an 
unreasonable risk; a mild mental illness; and a strong likelihood of 
engaging in future sexually violent offenses. Predators convicted of 
offenses under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) do not qualify for this 
subsection unless the court, in its discretion, believes that application of 
this subsection is appropriate under the circumstances. 
(b) Under this subsection, the court has a duty to order the least 
restrictive restraints on the predator's freedom in order to permit the 
predator societal interaction while minimizing the possibility of harm to 
the public. These restraints include, but are not limited to, house arrest, 
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attaching a radio transmitter to the predator, daily check-ins with 
probation officers, reduced periods at an alternative commitment facility, 
curfews, and denials of access to certain areas, such as schools. Any 
alternative or alternatives chosen by the court under this subsection must 
be coupled with a comprehensive treatment plan and a definite term for 
the alternative restriction. Under this subsection, courts are encouraged 
to create alternative solutions to achieve the treatment and protection 
goals of this Act. If the predator qualifies for the alternatives in this 
subsection, but· the court is unsatisfied that the proposed alternative 
restriction or restrictions would accomplish the Act's goals of treatment 
and protection, after providing the parties with adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter, the court shall order the predator 
committed under subsection (6) and state its reasons for so holding. 
COMMENTARY 
MSPA section 5 .2 is an innovative way to achieve the proper balance 
between society's interest and the interests of the predator. The 
guidelines established under the Act eliminate some of the most 
pervasive problems associated with indefinite civil commitment schemes. 
First, the guidelines provide the court with alternative levels of 
restriction that correspond to the individual's degree of mental illness, 
dangerousness, and prior offenses. Once the finder of fact has deter-
mined that the individual is a sexual predator, the guidelines ensure fair 
sentencing of the predator based on objective criteria. Second, the 
individual is properly confined at the level appropriate to his or her 
personal background. Under other commitment schemes, sexual 
predators are simply committed indefinitely regardless of the individual's 
actual dangerousness or the severity of his or her mental illness. The 
MSPA allows for restrictions ranging from indefinite commitment (for 
sexual predators with the highest propensities to offend again, combined 
with severe mental illnesses and most harmful past sexual conduct)33 
to the least restrictive alternatives possible (for sexual predators who are 
the least likely to offend again, combined with mild mental illnesses and 
past deviant sexual conduct).34 Third, the guidelines help to minimize 
33. MSPA § 5.2(1). 
34. MSPA § 5.2(7). The MSPA also calls for intermediate restrictions where the 
predator would be sent to a specialized housing facility that resembles a half-way house 
or committed to a secure facility for an assigned period of time instead of indefinitely. 
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the external political and societal pressures that could cause the court to 
choose the maximum commitment for any sexual predator. The court 
must use the specific findings from trial to choose the commitment term, 
unless it would be in the best interests of the predator and the public to 
deviate from the guidelines.35 Lastly, the predator will likely recover 
faster because he or she will receive the proper mixture of exposure to 
society, confinement, care, and treatment. 
§ 5 .3. HOUSING PREDATORS36 
Predators committed under sections 5.2(1)-(4) shall be housed in a 
secure facility for control, care, and treatment until such time as the 
individual's condition has so changed that he or she no longer satisfies 
the requirements of MSPA section 2(1) or the period of commitment 
expires without petition for renewal under MSPA section 5.5. Predators 
committed under sections 5.2(5)-(6) shall be entered into an alternative 
housing facility as defined under MSPA section 2(6) until such time as 
the individual's condition has so changed that he or she no longer 
satisfies the requirements of MSPA section 2(1) or the period of 
alternative commitment expires without petition for renewal under 
MSPA section 5.5. Predators committed under the provisions of section 
5 .2(7) shall have their freedom restricted in such manner as determined 
by the court until such time as the individual's condition has so changed 
that he or she no longer satisfies the requirements of MSPA section 2(1) 
or the period of the less restrictive commitment alternative expires 
without petition for renewal under MSPA section 5.5. 
§ 5.4. DEVIATION FROM COMMITMENT GUIDELINES37 
The Legislature has established a comprehensive commitment system 
aimed at minimizing intrusion on the predator's liberty interests, 
providing treatment, and maximizing societal protection. However, 
when deviation from the guidelines established in MSPA section 5 .2 
would be in the best interests of the predator and the public, and has 
reasonable support in the facts, the court may enhance or reduce the 
proposed restriction on the predator's freedom after providing the parties 
with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter. 
MSPA §§ 5.2(2)-(6). 
3 5. See MSP A § 5 .4 ( stating that after adequate notice, the court may enhance or 
reduce the commitment level provided there is reasonable support in the facts). 
36. This section was influenced by many civil commitment statutes. 
37. This section was created by the author. 
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§ 5.5. PETITION FOR RENEWAL OF COMMITMENT PERIOD38 
(1) Three weeks prior to the expiration of a period of commitment 
under this Act, the prosecuting authority may file a petition with the 
court for renewal of the predator's commitment. Failure to petition the 
court for renewal before the expiration of the predator's commitment is 
presumptive evidence that the individual is no longer a sexual predator 
and the court shall order the individual released. After a renewal 
petition is filed with the court, the rights of the parties under this section 
are identical to those provided for in MSPA sections 4.1-.2 and 5.1(1), 
except that for individuals committed for periods of one year or less, the 
court shall determine if the individual is still a sexual predator; for 
individuals committed for periods of more than one year, the individual 
shall have the right to a jury trial. The prosecuting attorney has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still 
suffers from a mental illness and poses a danger to commit future 
sexually violent offenses against the public. If the finder of fact 
determines that the individual is still a sexual predator, but with different 
categories of mental illness or dangerousness than when last determined, 
the court shall apply a new term of commitment pursuant to MSPA 
sections 5.2 and 5.4. Otherwise, if the predator's categories of mental 
illness and dangerousness remain the same as at the last determination 
of the issue, the court shall renew the predator's prior term of commit-
ment. 
(2) The predator has the right to waive this hearing. A valid waiver 
of the hearing constitutes a presumption that the individual is still a 
sexual predator. The court shall renew the term of commitment, absent 
facts that the predator's condition has worsened. In that case, the court 
shall determine the predator's current degrees of mental illness and 
dangerousness and commit the predator to the appropriate term under 
MSPA sections 5.2 and 5.4. 
38. This section was principally influenced by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.12 (West 
1995). 
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§ 6. PETITION FOR RELEASE FROM COMMITMENT39 
(l)(a) If the secretary of social services determines that an individual's 
condition has changed to the extent that he or she believes that the 
individual is no longer a sexual predator as defined under section 2(1 ), 
the secretary shall authorize the individual to petition the court for 
release. The release petition shall be served upon the court and 
prosecuting attorney and the court shall order a hearing on the matter 
within thirty days of the filing date. 
(b) If the prosecuting attorney does not respond to the predator's 
release petition within twenty days of receipt, absent a valid extension 
of time, the matter will be deemed presumptively conceded. The court 
shall then adopt the secretary's findings as its own at the hearing, if 
reasonable to do so, and release the individual from commitment. If the 
circumstances warrant, the court may apply appropriate conditions to the 
individual's release. 
( c) If the prosecuting attorney contests the release petition, the court 
shall set aside the hearing date and order a trial within thirty days. The 
procedures for trial and commitment under this section are governed by 
MSPA sections 4.1, 4.2(4) and 5.1-.4. 
(2)(a) A predator may petition the court for release without the 
secretary's authorization as a matter of right during the commitment, 
provided the period of commitment is longer than one year. For 
commitment periods of one year or less, the secretary's authorization is 
required. Unless paragraph ( c) applies, upon filing of the petition, the 
court shall set a hearing date within thirty days and direct the secretary 
to prepare a mental health evaluation of the individual, including reports 
from mental health professionals with substantial knowledge of the 
individual's present condition. 
(b) The secretary's evaluation and any evaluations prepared on the 
petitioner's behalf should be submitted to the court at least five days 
prior to the hearing. At the hearing, the court shall determine if there 
is probable cause for the predator's claim. If so, the prosecuting 
attorney shall be given fourteen days to respond to the claim. Failure 
to respond within the allotted time constitutes a presumption that the 
individual is no longer a sexual predator and the court shall order the 
individual released. After a response is filed with the court, trial shall 
be commenced within thirty days. The trial procedures under this. 
section are identical to those provided for in MSPA sections 4.1-.2 and 
39. This section was created by incorporating portions ofILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, 
paras. 205/9, 10 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 253B.18(5), (7)(West 1995); and WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.090-.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
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5.1(1), except that the finder of fact need only determine whether the 
individual is a sexual predator. 
( c) After denying a predator's initial petition for release during any 
one term of commitment, the court shall scrutinize subsequent petitions 
for sufficient grounds that lend support to the individual's claim that he 
or she is no longer a sexual predator before ordering a hearing and a 
new mental health evaluation. If sufficient grounds exist, the court shall 
follow the procedures in paragraph 2(b ). 
(3) For good cause shown, the court may extend time for trial or a 
response to a release petition up to an additional thirty days. The court 
may consolidate renewal and release petitions into one hearing or trial 
when practicable. Nothing in this section creates a right to freedom if 
the individual's confinement can be continued on alternative basis. 
§ 7 .1 . RIGHTS OF COMMITTED PREDATORS40 
All predators civilly committed to the secure or alternative housing 
facilities and, where applicable, predators committed under less 
restrictive commitment alternatives are entitled to: 
(1) Mental health evaluations at least every twelve months or once per 
term, whichever is more often; 
(2) Individualized treatment plans as defined under MSPA section 7.2; 
(3) Available and adequate treatment; 
( 4) Access, for purposes of evaluation, to all records and reports 
related to the predator's commitment, control, care, and treatment; 
(5) Wear their own personal clothes, keep personal possessions, and 
furnish their living quarters, within reason; 
(6) Reasonable freedom of movement within the facility; 
(7) Have approved visitors within reasonable limitations; 
(8) Reasonable access to receive and send correspondence and 
telephone calls; 
(9) Retain his or her own qualified mental health professionals in lieu 
of the department's professionals and have reasonable access to these 
prof1;Jssionals; 
(10) Reasonable access to his or her attorney and to have an attorney 
appointed if indigent; 
(11) Be present at any court proceedings involving the predator; 
40. This section is principally derived from the Washington Administrative Code. 
See WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 275-155-050 (1994). 
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(12) Receive notice of his or her right to petition the court for release 
from the commitment; 
(13) Petition the court for release from commitment; 
(14) Opt to voluntarily waive the right to a hearing; and 
(15) Opt to voluntarily waive his or her right to petition the court for 
release. 
§ 7.2. INDIVIDUALIZED TREATMENT PLAN 41 
(I) When the court commits a person as a sexual predator, social 
services staff must develop an individualized treatment plan ("ITP") for 
that person. The ITP shall include, but is not limited to: 
( a) A description of the predator's specific treatment needs; 
(b) An outline of intermediate and long-range treatment goals; 
( c) A projected timetable for reaching the treatment goals; 
( d) The treatment strategies for achieving the treatment goals; 
( e) A description of the social services staff's responsibilities; and 
(f) Criteria for recommending to the court whether release, less 
restrictive alternatives, or modification of the person's confinement 
should be considered. 
(2) The predator's ITP must be reviewed and updated at least every 
six months. 
41. This section is derived from the Washington Administrative Code. See WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE § 275-155-040 (1994). 
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